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A DEFENSE OF THE TAX COURT'S RESULT IN
PRUNIER AND CASALE
Joseph T. Sneedt
Occasionally the always slightly febrile world of federal tax law
undergoes a series of shocks, generally attributable to some pronounce-
ments of the Treasury, the Tax Court, or the Supreme Court, which
cause a sizeable part of the tax bar to pen articles and notes describing
the unfortunate consequences of these misguided determinations.' The
object of these writings, to persuade the other portions of the Judiciary
or Congress to obviate these consequences, often has been achieved in
recent years. In the past few months this pattern of events has been
repeated largely as a result of two Tax Court decisions-Prunier and
Casale. Both now have been reversed4 and huzzas can be heard dis-
tinctly by even the most untrained ear. There is much to be said in
favor of this victory and, since most of it has been said, a paper repeat-
ing these points would serve no purpose. However, the results of these
Tax Court decisions, if not their reasoning, as they affect contracts be-
tween the shareholders of a closely held corporation and their corpora-
tions providing for the purchase of shares of a deceased shareholder,
deserve a better defense than they have received thus far. This paper is
to present that defense.
I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS ISSUES
The facts of Prunier and Casale are well known. In the former, J. S.
Prunier & Sons, Inc., whose stock was almost entirely owned by Henry
E. Prunier, president and treasurer, and Joseph E. Prunier, vice-presi-
dent, paid premiums on insurance policies totalling $45,000 on each of
the lives of Henry and Joseph during the taxable year of 1950. In this
year none of the policies or their endorsements named J. S. Prunier
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 449, for biographical data.
1 That this is an honorable calling is obvious.
2 28 T.C. 19 (1957).
3 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
4 Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957) and Casale v. Commissioner,
247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
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Sons, Inc., as beneficiary, nor was there anything therein indicating that
the corporation was the owner of the policies.5 However, the corporate
minute book contained an entry evidencing an agreement between Henry
and Joseph executed late in 1946 which provided that in the event of
the death of either, the policies each had on the life of the other "shall
go to the corporation" and "this money is to be used by the corporation
to buy out the interest of the party that dies." 6 In addition, the cor-
porate minutes reflected that on November 2, 1950 the stockholders
agreed that the fair value of all the corporate stock was $110,000 and
that this value was to be used when the corporation purchased the "in-
terest" of a deceased stockholder "with the insurance money."7 The Tax
5 The policies generally seemed to indicate that the usual incidents of ownership were
held by the beneficiary-brother. The status in 1950 appearing from the policies was as
follows:
1942 Policy Covering Joseph's Life In The Amount of $5,000.
Beneficiary-Henry
Incidents of Ownership-Henry possessed the exclusive right to change the beneficiary
while living; if not, Joseph was to have such right.
1942 Policy Covering Henry's Life In The Amount of $5,000.
Beneficiary-Joseph
Incidents of Ownership--Joseph possessed the exclusive right to change the bene-
ficiary while living; if not, Henry was to have such rights.
1946 Policy Covering Joseph's Life In The Amount of $5,000.
Beneficiary-Henry
Incidents of Ownership-Henry possessed the exclusive right to change the bene-
ficiary while living; if not, Joseph was to have such rights.
1946 Policy Covering Henry's Life In The Amount of $5,000.
Beneficiary-Joseph
Incidents of Ownership-Joseph possessed the exclusive right to change the bene-
ficiary while living; if not, Henry was to have such rights.
1947 Policy Covering Joseph's Life In The Amount of $10,000.
Beneficiary-Henry
Incidents of Ownership-Application by Joseph stated all rights were to be shared
by insured and beneficiary which was to be the corporation.
1947 Policy Covering Henry's Life In The Amount of $10,000.
Beneficiary-Joseph
Incidents of Ownership-Application by Henry stated all rights to be shared by in-
sured and Joseph.
1950 Policy Covering Joseph's Life In The Amount of $25,000.
Beneficiary-Henry
Incidents of Ownership-Nothing indicated in the Tax Court Findings of Fact.
1950 Policy Covering Henry's Life In The Amount of $25,000.
Beneficiary-Joseph
Incidents of Ownership-Nothing indicated in the Tax Court Findings of Fact.
6 The text of the entry is as follows:
It is understood and agreed that any policies that Henry . .. has on Joseph . . . and
any policies that Joseph has on Henry . . . shall go to the corporations in the event
of the death of either of them and this money is to be used by the corporation to buy
out the interest of the party that dies.
These policies are the ones that the corporation pays the premiums on.
This will apply to any policies that may be bought in the future. 28 T.C. at 21.
7 The entry reflecting this agreement reads as follows:
A special meeting of the stockholders and directors of J. S. Prunier & Sons, Inc.,
was held at the office of the corporation, on Thursday, November 2, 1950 at 7:30 P.M.
On motion duly made and seconded, the following was proposed and agreed, upon
and made part of the by-laws:
It was agreed by and between Joseph E. Prunier, Vice-President and Henry E.
Prunier, President and Treasurer and present stockholders that the fair value of the
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Court in its findings of fact stated that at the time the policies were
written the insurance agent was informed by Henry and Joseph of the
agreements which the policies were to carry out; that no deduction for
the premiums paid was claimed by the corporation; that the corporate
surplus was adjusted on Schedule M of the corporate return for premiums
paid on life of an officer "where the corporation is directly or indirectly
a beneficiary"; and that Henry and Joseph intended that the corporation
should be the owner of the '"proceeds of the policies" on the life of a de-
ceased shareholder for the sole purpose of purchasing the stock of the
deceased at the agreed upon price. The issue was whether the premium
payments were taxable income to Henry and Joseph.
In Casale the taxpayer was the president and principal stockholder of
0. Casale Inc., owning ninety-eight of the one-hundred shares of its
outstanding stock. In December, 1948 the corporation was authorized
by its board of directors, consisting of the taxpayer, his daughter, and
an employee of the corporation, to enter into a contract with the tax-
payer whereby the corporation would become obligated to pay him,
upon certain contingencies, a monthly income upon his reaching the
age of sixty-five, or, should he die prior thereto, to his nominee or
estate, a certain sum. On the same date the corporation entered into
a contract with the taxpayer providing for deferred compensation in
the form of $500 per month upon his reaching the age of sixty-five, or,
should he sooner die, the sum of $50,000 to his nominee or estate. A
few days after this corporate action The Equitable Life Assurance
Society issued to the corporation an insurance policy on the life of the
taxpayer whose terms generally coincided with the obligations the cor-
poration had undertaken in its contract with the taxpayer. The corpora-
tion was designated as the beneficiary of the policy, possessed the right
to assign, or change the beneficiary of the policy, and had the right to
receive dividends under the policy and to borrow thereon up to its cash
surrender value. The contract between the corporation and the taxpayer
Corporation stock is: ONE HUNDRED AND TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($110,000.00) and it is their desire that this be the value used should a stockholder
sever his connection with the corporation, or in the event of death of either that the
corporation will purchase the interest of the deceased party at said value, with the in-
surance money.
It was also voted, at said meeting that both Joseph E. and Henry E. Prunier would
issue each five of their shares to Irene M. Prunier, Clerk.
In witness whereof they have executed this agreement, on this third day of November
1950.
[sgd.] Joseph E. Prunier
Vice-Pres.
[sgd.] Henry E. Prunier
President & Treas.
Witness: [sgd.] Omer E. Prunier
28 T.C. at 22.
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provided that his and his nominee's rights under the contract would
be forfeited should he voluntarily leave the employ of the corporation
against its wishes prior to reaching the age of sixty-five, or should he,.
subsequent to retirement, accept employment from any competitor of the
corporation without its consent. However, termination of his employ-
ment because of insolvency of the corporation was not to be regarded
as a voluntary leaving of his employment." During the taxable year
1950, the corporation, which was engaged in the business of making
topcoats, overcoats and raincoats, paid a premium of $6,839.50 on the
policy issued by Equitable. The issue was whether the premium pay-
ment was a taxable dividend to the taxpayer.
The Tax Court in Prunier, after distinguishing situations in which
the corporation is a beneficiary of policies from those where the estate
or family of a corporate employee or officer is the beneficiary, 9 held that
the corporation was neither the beneficial owner nor the beneficiary of
the policies and that the premiums were taxable income to Henry and
Joseph. This holding was based on three observations-that the cor-
poration would not be enriched by the receipt of the proceeds from the
policies on the life of a deceased shareholder because, apparently, the
entire amount was to be paid to the estate of the deceased in exchange
for his stock; that the policies themselves did not indicate that the cor-
poration was to be the beneficiary; and that, by the purchase of the
stock of the deceased, the survivor would have his proportional interest
in the corporation increased at no cost to him in addition to acquiring
the power to designate the beneficiary of the policies covering his life.
In reversing, the first circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Magruder,
concluded: (a) that the corporation under Massachusetts local law was
the beneficial owner of the eight policies because it could have obtained
the help of a court of equity to recover the proceeds, (b) that to consider
8 The pertinent provision reads as follows:
* ' . provided, however, that the said ORESTE CASALE and any person or persons
designated by him to receive the above mentioned pension payments after his death
and his estate shall forfeit all right to the said pension payments if the said ORESTE
CASALE voluntarily leaves the employ of this CORPORATION, against the wishes
of the CORPORATION, prior to the date upon which he attains the age of 65 years,
or such earlier date for his retirement as may be agreed upon; it being understood that
for the purposes of this agreement and for the accrual of his rights to the payments
herein provided he will be deemed as continuing in the employ of this CORPORATION
until he attains the age of 69, or until any other earlier retirement date agreed upon,
if his employment is in fact terminated (1) by the CORPORATION without fault on
his part, (2) because of this CORPORATION's insolvency or (3) because of any
wrongful act or default on the part of the CORPORATION: and further provided that
if the said ORESTE CASALE subsequent to such retirement accepts employment from
any competitor of this CORPORATION, without the consent of this CORPORATION,
all right to any further pension payments hereunder shall be forfeited by him and by
any person or persons designated by him to receive such payments and by his estate.
247 F.2d at 444.
9 See p. 360 infra.
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any corporate benefit as a benefit to the shareholders, pro tanto, would
ignore the corporate entity, a position not being urged by the govern-
ment, (c) that the corporation would be enriched by the receipt of
the insurance proceeds and the purchase of the stock of the deceased
shareholder because the stock would be an asset of the corporation,
(d) that the purchase of the insurance served a business purpose of the
corporation, (e) that there was "limited utility" in the distinction be-
tween stockholder purposes and corporate business purposes, and (f)
that the tax consequences upon death of either Henry and Joseph were
not before the court.
A different line of approach was taken by the Tax Court in Casale.
Stating that the issue was whether the entire transaction was "a sham
for tax purposes," the court, after pointing to: (a) the similarity of the
arrangement involved and one in which the taxpayer owned the policy
upon which the corporation paid the premium, (b) the commanding posi-
tion the taxpayer occupied in the corporation, (c) the immediate eco-
nomic benefit the taxpayer received upon the payment of the first
premium, (d) the remoteness of any possibility of forfeiture of rights
by the taxpayer, (e) the short life of the corporation, and (f) its failure
to declare dividends, concluded that the transaction "lacked bona fides
and was merely a device whereby petitioner attempted to avail himself
of corporate funds without incurring a tax upon their use." Consequently,
the premium payment was equivalent to a dividend. This statement of
the issue was rejected by the second circuit, speaking through Judge
Hincks. As this court saw it the question was, "Are corporate expendi-
tures of a corporation actively engaged in business deemed to be pro-
portionate distributions to controlling shareholders for tax purposes?"'
Since the answer to this question is obviously no, the court devoted it-
self to establishing that the corporation was not a sham or alter ego of
the shareholder and that the premium payments were "corporate ex-
penditures." The sham argument was put aside by pointing to the
substantial business done by the corporation. The premium payments
were made "corporate expenditures" by observing that the insurance
policy acquired by the corporation was a corporate asset subject to the
claims of creditors of the corporation, including the taxpayer, that the
proceeds of the policies could exceed the amount of the corporation's
obligation to the taxpayer, and that no immediate personal benefit re-
sulted from the corporate purchase of the policy. Thus, the premium
payments were not dividends.
The cause for alarm which developed at the time of the Tax Court
10 247 F.2d at 443.
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decisions in these cases is not difficult to appreciate. Probably many
stockholders of closely held corporations had entered into properly
drawn contracts with their corporation which provided: (1) that insur-
ance on their lives would be obtained by the corporation, (2) that the
premiums would be paid by the corporation, (3) that the corporation
would be the beneficiary and beneficial owner of the policies, and (4)
that upon the death of a stockholder the proceeds, along with whatever
additional cash may be necessary, were to be used by the corporation to
purchase the shares of the deceased. Others, as in Prunier, had entered
into badly drafted arrangements having a similar purpose but which left
some doubt as to the beneficiary, or beneficial owner, of the policies.
Were the premium payments taxable dividends in each instance? If
so, what was thought to be a highly advantageous arrangement for re-
ducing income taxes on corporate income at the shareholder level would
be eliminated."
Consequently, it is small wonder then that Prunier and Casale at-
tracted attention, and that the Service is making an effort to curb the
use of these arrangements. This highly probable revenue loss can be
11 To illustrate, assume A and B each own 50% of the total outstanding stock of the
X Corporation which has assets of $100,000, capital of $25,000, and surplus of $75,000.
Assume further that both shareholders are taxed at an effective rate of 40%; that B's
basis in his stock is $12,500, that A, B, and X Corporation enter into an arrangement
such as described; that the premiums on the policies covering the life of A and B amount
to $4,000 each; that the policies provide for $50,000 payable upon death; and that the
contract with X Corporation expressly provides that the value of the proceeds of insur-
ance upon death and the value of the policy covering the life of the survivor are not to be
considered in valuing the stock of the deceased shareholder. If the insurance premiums paid
by X are not taxable to A and B only $8,000 in corporate earnings after taxes are required
to carry the policies whereas should such premiums be considered taxable dividends cor-
porate earnings after taxes in the amount of $13,334 would be necessary. This results from
the 'fact that at an effective rate of 40% a distribution to A or B of $6,667 is necessary to
yield to them the after tax sum of $4,000. Thus each year the arrangement continues the
Treasury fails to collect $2,667 in taxes from each shareholder-a total of $5,334. At the
end of ten years the revenue loss will amount to $53,340 in round figures. Should A die
at this time, the value of the business being the same as here assumed, his estate would
receive $50,000 in exchange for his shares and B then would own all the controlling stock
of X which has assets of $100,000 plus the cash surrender value of the policy on B's life.
Assuming this policy has a cash surrender value of $10,000, the liquidation of X Cor-
poration would yield a gain to B of $97,500 ($110,000-12,500). The maximum tax to B
would amount to $24,375. This may be the only income tax, and it is by no means an
inevitable one, which is incurred at the shareholder level in this entire transaction. See
p. 371 infra. Had the premiums been taxed as dividends the income tax cost would be
$53,340 plus a certain amount of gain to B on liquidation. The liquidation gain should
not be as great as in the example used since the $50,000 in insurance proceeds should go
to increase B's basis in his stock where B is charged with income as a result of the premium
payments. The low basis afforded the surviving shareholder in the example is a disadvantage
of these arrangements. See, White, Business Insurance 397 (2d ed. 1956). Of course, other
assumptions of fact would produce different income tax consequences. Generally speaking,
however, the higher the tax rate of the shareholders, the longer the premiums are paid before
the death of a shareholder, and the greater the value of the deceased shareholders stock, the
larger the income tax savings. Of course, a bargain purchase of the deceased's shares, al-
though resulting in a greater potential tax upon sale or liquidation by the survivor, is not
a tragedy to the survivor. For a comparison of a stock retirement plan with a cross pur-
chase arrangement with premiums paid from salary, see Steinberg, "Funding Stock-Re-
demption Agreements With Insurance," 35 Taxes 669, 672 (1957).
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shrugged off with the hard headed observation, based on impeccable
authority, that every taxpayer has the legal right to decrease, or al-
together avoid, his taxes by any means the law permits 2 and that to
"demand more in the name of morals is mere cant."' 3 This would
finish the matter but for two things. First, the law is not clearly in line
with the taxpayer's assertions, the first and second circuit to the contrary
notwithstanding. And second, not every taxpayer who is a shareholder
of a closely held corporation can take advantage of the stock retirement
arrangement apparently sanctioned by Prunier and Casale. Some are
forced by reason of the attribution of stock ownership rules of section
318 and the redemption provisions of section 302 of the Code to employ
"cross-purchase" arrangements whereby the policies are held and premi-
ums paid by the shareholders, thus requiring a distribution of corporate
earnings to the shareholders with the attending tax at the shareholder level.
The disastrous effect of section 318 when combined with section 302
has been pointed out on numerous occasions.' 4 One illustration will
suffice. Suppose the X corporation has outstanding only 100 shares of
voting common stock of which father owns 50 shares, mother 30 shares,
and son 20 shares. Father's will leaves one-half of his estate to mother
and the residue, after taxes, to son. An agreement among the three and
the X corporation, whereby father's shares were to be purchased by
the corporation upon his death, would be a highly dangerous and in-
advisable arrangement since the proceeds would be considered a dividend
distribution to father's estate. The reasons for this bear repeating. The
purchase of father's stock is a redemption of his stock within the mean-
ings of the Code.' 5 Redemptions will result in dividend treatment to
the distributee unless: (1) the distribution is not essentially equivalent
to a dividend, or (2) it is substantially disproportionate as defined in
the Code, or (3) terminates the shareholder's interest." The distribu-
tion to father's estate will probably not be considered "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend. " " In addition, the retirement of all father's
12 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d
462 (6th Cir. 1953).
13 judge Hand dissenting in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850 (2d Cir. 1947).
14 E.g., Hoffman, "1954 Code Can Turn Buy-Sell Agreements into Disastrous Tax Traps
for Stockholders," 4 J. Taxation 322 (1956); Winton, "Tax Traps in Stockholders Agree-
ments," 2 Practical Lawyer, No. 3, 78 (1956); Roeder, "Distributions in Redemption of
Stock," N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed. Tax 475 (1957).
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 317(b).
16 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302.
17 Rev. Rul. 55-515, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 222. The ruling sets forth this test. "The ques-
tion of whether a redemption of stock is essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend depends
primarily upon the net effect of the distribution rather than the motive or plan of the
stockholders or the corporation. A redemption of stock which does not as a practical
matter change the essential relationship between the stockholders and the corporation is
generally considered equivalent to a dividend." (223) Because of the constructive ownership
rules there will probably be no required change in the essential relationship. Indeed, the
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stock by payment to his estate will not result "in a termination of the
shareholder's interest" because the estate is considered to own the stock
of its beneficiaries 8 -mother and son in this case. Thus, the estate
"owns" all the stock both before and after the redemption. 19 This being
so, there obviously has been no substantially disproportionate redemp-
tion of stock because one requirement of such a redemption is that the
shareholder, the estate here, following distribution own "less than 50
per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock en-
titled to vote."2 Thus, the redemption would be a dividend to father's
estate. Should the corporation fund its obligation with insurance the
receipt of the proceeds by the estate would be a dividend distribution,
thus bunching the income avoided at the shareholder level under the
rationale of Prunier and Casale.
So, in essence, the arrangement so unnecessarily blessed with vigor in
Prunier can be a tax haven for only a chosen few. And these few,
selected because of the absence of a family relationship or certain
testamentary dispositions, have no justifiable claim to this advantage.
And certainly it should not exist as an aid to marketing insurance. Not
only does the arrangement do violence to the principle that equals should
be taxed equally, but any intelligent tax relief to small business should
not proceed on such a capricious basis. However, this is "mere cant"
if the law, as now written, requires the result.
As indicated, this may not be the case although admittedly the issue
is close. The thesis of this paper is that where the stock retirement con-
tract gives the estate of a deceased shareholder an enforceable right to
have the proceeds of insurance received by the corporation applied to
the purchase of the stock of the deceased, the premiums paid on such
policies should be considered as dividends to the shareholders to the
extent of the earnings and profits of the corporation, notwithstanding
the fact that the insurance policy is owned and premiums paid by the
corporation. The legal issues are obvious. The existence of a dividend
requires a distribution of property out of its earnings and profits by a
corporation in respect to its stock to its shareholders.21 This simply
means that corporate gains must in some way be realized by the share-
scope of the first exception is probably quite narrow. See, Roeder, supra note 14, at 485.
A statutory change which could alter the position stated in the text has been suggested.
Sub-chapter C Advisory Group Proposed Amendments § 3 (1957).
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 318(a) (2) (A).
19 The possibility of avoiding attribution of a beneficiary's shares to the estate by dis-
tributing the devise or bequest to the beneficiary before the redemption is not available here
since if Mother received a distribution before redemption the estate would still own all the
Son's shares who in turn would own all his Mother's. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1. 318-3(a) (1955);
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 318(a) (1) (A) (ii).
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 302(b) (2) (B).
21 Lnt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 301(a), (c), 316(a).
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holders at the shareholder level. In short, to support the thesis here ad-
vanced, a showing of realization of gain by the shareholders to the extent
of the premiums paid is necessary. The demonstration will proceed by
suggesting, as others have done before, the ingredients of such a realiza-
tion and how these exist in the ordinary stock retirement plan.
II. REALiZAT N ASPECTS
Some years ago Henry C. Simons, whose works should be read more
extensively than seems to be the case, observed that the problem of the
proper tax treatment of stock dividends was proximately "one of un-
distributed corporate earnings" and "at bottom . . . [attributable to]
the present avoidance loopholes at gift and death.122 Much the same can
be said of the problem discussed here. If there were any accounting
for growth in the shares at the time of either death or gift, the concern
with use of the corporate form to insulate the shareholders from tax on
its earnings would diminish. The deceased shareholder would be taxed
on the difference between his basis and the insurance proceeds and the
survivor would account for the difference between his cost and the
value of his shares at the date of gift or death. This pattern, joined
with the abolition of the distinction between ordinary income and capital
gains rates, would eliminate the necessity for urging that the premium
payments generally should be considered income to the shareholder.
The gains resulting to the shareholders from investment in insurance
would be accounted for when the shareholder parted with his investment.
However, such is not the case. Gift and death transfers result in no
realization of gain to the transferor, and, in the case of death, the
growth in the shareholder's investment escapes taxation altogether.
Considering for the moment that the tax imposed at the corporate level
is to compensate for these limitations,2 3 the issue in Prunier was simply
whether this tax at the corporate level was a fairer approximation of
the appropriate tax on the increase in the net worth of the shareholders
than would be attained by treating the insurance premiums as dividend
income to the shareholders and imposing a tax at the corporate level.
It is extremely difficult to generalize on this, but the odds are that in
most cases the latter procedure would yield a more accurate estimate.2 4
22 Simons, "Federal Tax Reform," 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 47 (1946).
23 Simons, supra note 22, at 32 makes this observation." As we have argued throughout,
personal income taxes are good taxes; corporation income taxes are bad; and complicated
admixtures of the two are, in principle and in practice, monstrosities. Present realization
procedure in the personal tax, however, offers us choice only among such monstrosities."
24 There is a complicating nuance which prevents extending this statement to Casale.
In it the real possibility of taxing to the shareholder, as dividends, the proceeds of the
insurance distributed to him or his estate means that the profit from the corporate invest-
ment in insurance will probably be taxed to the shareholder. See Lawthers, "Weakness in
Casale Decision: Insolvency Could Destroy Benefit to Owner-Employee," 5 J. Taxation 342
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However this may be, the stockholders in stock retirement plans de-
sire, as do stockholders generally, to have corporate earnings retained
by the corporation until the potential tax on the growth of their invest-
ment can be avoided, or eliminated, by gift or death. Thus, the issue
becomes one of the taxation of undistributed corporate earnings. Funda-
mentally, the present tax structure makes available to the Treasury only
two courses of action. It can seek to apply the provisions of the ac-
cumulated earnings tax set forth in sections 531 through 537 of the
Code, about which something will be said later, or it can assert that
the profits have in fact been distributed. To succeed in showing a
distribution there must be a showing of realization of income by the
shareholder. This is what the stock dividend, as well as the early re-
organization cases were about,2 5 and no less is true of Prunier and
Casale. A finding of income realized by the shareholders in a stock re-
tirement plan should be no easier, nor appreciably more difficult, than
it was in those cases.
What then do those decisions, glossed as they are by related cases,26
teach as to the essentials of realization by a shareholder of accumulated
corporate gains?
Here the path is well travelled and no attempt will be made to forge
new ways. Rather, the existing views will be summarized and somewhat
sharpened. To commence, two key passages of Eisner v. Macomber2 - -
by now a somewhat lonely, but somehow wonderfully defiant figure-
will be recalled. These two, both of which once were part of the cate-
chism of realization dogma, have been chosen because they reveal the
premises of that decision, so ably demonstrated long ago by Seligman.28
The first, almost poetic in its redundancy, is this:
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a
growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit,
something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed
from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being
"derived", that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer)
for his separate use, benefit and disposal;-that is income derived from
property. Nothing else answers the description29
(1956). Of course, the observation made in the text assumes the surviving shareholder
would not be taxed on the proceeds as a dividend distribution. But see p. 371 infra.
25 The cases referred to are as follows: Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943);
Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937);
Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936); Marr v. Umited States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925);
Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176
(1921); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920).
26 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
27 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
28 Seligman, "Implications and Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision," 21 Colum. L.
Rev. 313 (1921).
29 252 U.S. at 207.
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Here, as Seligman points out, is revealed the requirement that realiza-
tion of income requires its separation from capital along with the warn-
ing that the requirement is seriously intended. Further proof of this, as
well as the admonition that the corporate entity cannot be ignored in
determining whether there has been such a separation, is revealed in
this passage.
The essential and controlling fact is that the stockholder has received
nothing out of the company's assets for his separate use and benefit; on
the contrary, every dollar of his original investment, together with what-
ever accretions and accumulations have resulted from employment of
his money and that of the other stockholders in the business of the com-
pany, still remains the property of the company, and subject to business
risks which may result in wiping out the entire investment. Having
regard to the very truth of the matter, to substance and not to form, he
has received nothing that answers the definition of income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.3 °
How these brave words came to stand for less than their logical im-
port is well remembered. Mr. Justice Brandeis in Marr v. United States
expressly approved the argument that in a corporate reorganization the
"gain in value resulting from profits" is taxable to the shareholder
"when it is represented by an essentially different interest in the same
business enterprise or property. . . ."31 He distinguished Eisner v. Ma-
comber and its principal satellite, Weiss v. Stearn,2 by pointing out that
in Marr the stockholders after the distribution did not have "the same
proportional interest of the same kind in essentially the same corpora-
tion."3  Mr. Justice Roberts in Helvering v. Sprouse84 refined the
test for recognizing taxable stock dividends by observing that "there
must be a change brought about by the issue of shares as a dividend
whereby the proportional interest of the stockholder after the distribu-
tion was essentially different from his former interest.13 5
In the earlier case of Helvering v. Bruun,6 the same Justice had fur-
ther restricted the scope of Eisner v. Macomber by observing:
Gain may occur as a result of exchange of property, payment of the tax-
payer's indebtedness, relief from liability, or other profit realized from
the completion of a transaction. The fact that gain is a portion of the
value of property received by the taxpayer in the transaction does not
negative its realization.3 7 (Emphasis added.)
30 Id. at 211.
31 268 U.S. 536, 540 (1925).
32 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
13 268 U.S. at 542.
34 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
35 Id. at 608.
36 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
37 Id. at 469.
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However, in Helvering v. Horst,38 decided in the term following
Bruun, Mr. Justice Roberts dissented from perhaps the most nearly
explicit rejection of the philosophy of Eisner v. Macomber yet uttered
by the Court. In finding that the donor of a negotiable interest coupon
realized income where the donee received payment thereon in the same
year in which the transfer was made, the Court, in speaking of the rule
that income is not taxable until realized, said:
The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of post-
ponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually
the receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation
where the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the
taxpayer's personal receipt of money or property. 39
The gift of the coupon was found to be the "final event of enjoyment"
since the donor used the coupon to obtain a "satisfaction which is pro-
curable only by the expenditure of money or money's worth."'4 Finally,
whatever vitality remained in the notion that the presence of income
required a severance from capital disappeared when the Court in Com-
missioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.41 found that punitive damages for fraud
and treble damages for violations of the federal antitrust laws con-
stituted taxable income even though such receipts can hardly be said
to be "derived from capital." Citing Bruun and United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co.,42 the Court gently put aside Eisner v. Macomber and held
such damages taxable because they were "undeniable accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion. ' '141
The writers are not entirely agreed as to the meaning of these deci-
sions. Magill, in his study of stock dividends published in 1936,'4 ap-
proved the test that Dean Hall had earlier expressed in the following
form:
Perhaps the best crucial test of a corporate stockholder's having "realized"
a dividend, so as to make it taxable as income, is that as a result of the
transaction he obtains a new interest in property differing either (1) in
kind or (2) in extent from that which he had before.45
In 1945, Magill pointed out that the stock dividend and corporate
reorganization cases, in making a change of the form or extent of the
38 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
39 Id. at 116.
40 Id. at 117.
41 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
42 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
43 348 U.S. at 431.
44 Magill, "Realization of Income Through Corporate Distributions," 36 Colum. L. Rev.
519, 532 (1936).
45 Note, "Exchange of Securities in Corporate Reorganization As Income," 20 Ill. L.
Rev. 601, 602 (1926).
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investment the touchstone of taxability, had established "a reasonable
and convenient occasion for taking stock of the accretion in value to the
investment as represented by the distribution which the stockholders
have received."' Easily recognized change of circumstances was also
relied upon by Surrey as a proper occasion for imposing a tax upon
previously untaxed economic gain.47 Leaning on Bruun, Surrey bluntly
asserted that the requirement of realization is nothing but an admonition
that, where the taxpayer's wealth has increased, the time chosen to
tax this increase be convenient from the standpoint of the government
and the taxpayer. How much "fairness to the taxpayer ' 4 7a is implicit in
Surrey's notion of convenience is not clear. However this may be, mani-
festly realization does not turn upon "severance" or "disposition" in
his thinking. Bittker has been no less emphatic.
Despite Eisner v. Macomber, I think all taxpayers could be put on an
annual inventory basis with appreciation and depreciation being tallied up
and taken into the tax return at year's end. 48
And Dean Griswold, as a matter of constitutional law, probably accepts
this view, although his expressions were more guarded.49 Against this
host, monolithic in their unanimity, one must set the truculent assertions
of Roehner and Roehner who recently have insisted that realization
is a constitutional doctrine which establishes that income from capital
exists only when something is "'coming in' for the use of capital."'50
Whatever the case may be as a matter of constitutional law, Dean
Griswold appears right when he insists that our tax system requires
realization, in addition to a mere increase in wealth, as a conditon to the
imposition of an income tax. 1 However, the requirement serves many
purposes. It restrains the hand of the tax gatherer while there is a
serious doubt about whether the gain is more hope than fulfillment52
46 Magill, Taxable Income (rev. ed. 1945).
47 Surrey, "The Supreme Court and The Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the
Recent Decisions," 35 III. L. Rev. 779, 784 (1941).
47a Surrey, supra note 47, at 792.
48 Bittker, "Charitable Gifts of Income and The Internal Revenue Code: Another View,"
65 Harv. L. Rev. 1375, 1380 (1952).
49 Griswold, "Charitable Gifts of Income and The Internal Revenue Code," 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 84 (1951). At p. 86 he says: "There was a time when our tax law was much con-
cerned with problems of realization. It now would appear to some that perhaps this
approach was unduly conceptualistic, and that the tax law has made progress in freeing
itself somewhat from the rigidity of the older test." However, in his reply to Bittker, 65
Harv. L. Rev. 1389 (1952), he said, "For better or for worse, we are operating under a tax
system which regards realization as of some importance. Even though this may not neces-
sarily be a constitutional requirement, it is a practical conclusion. Without 'realization' of
some sort, we do not take income into account. Consequently, the mere having of unrealized
appreciation is not income."
5o Roehner and Roehner, "Realization: Administrative Convenience or Constitutional
Requirement?" 8 Tax L. Rev. 173, 183 (1952).
51 Griswold, supra note 49.
52 E.g., the taxation of annuity payments where appreciated property is exchanged for
an annuity. Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 53.
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and while the calculation of its amount is extremely difficult.5" As in-
dicated by Magill and Surrey, the requirement fixes the time of the tax
in accordance with certain notions of expediency; and in certain in-
stances, as in the case of transfer by death or gift, eliminates the tax
because of deep seated ideas about the undesirability of making such
occasions taxable events. By equating realization with control of the
earning process and the receipt of benefits which, in the language of
Horst, "can be obtained only by the expenditures of money or property,"
the requirement prevents avoidance of the progressive rate structure by
identifying the proper taxpayer to whom income should be charged.
And in the corporate area, it serves to maintain the distinction between
corporate and shareholder income-a distinction made necessary, if not
by the constitution, certainly by the Code's imposition of a tax at the
corporate level.
Any doctrine laden, as realization is, with such a purposive overload
can hardly have rigid requirements. The cloth must be cut to the pat-
tern. For example, a mere enhancement in the value of shares owned
by a shareholder because of corporate business profits should not be taxed
to the shareholder because this eliminates a distinction, albeit perhaps
not a wise one, deeply rooted in the Code itself. On the other hand, the
corporate structure should not be used to shield from the income tax
the shareholder who derives benefits, distinct from those normally flow-
ing to a shareholder because of the success of the trade or business of the
corporation, through accumulation and investment of the corporate
earnings. The doctrine of realization is sufficiently flexible to make
this distinction. The receipt of such benefits, where adequately measur-
able, constitutes "an essentially different interest in the same business
enterprise or property," "profit realized from the completion of a trans-
action," satisfactions "procurable only by the expenditure of money or
money's worth," and a convenient and expedient time to impose the tax.
Obviously the courts in fashioning realization so as to remove the
shield must be mindful of the words of Congress. Thus, Code sections
531 through 537 dealing with accumulated corporate earnings are su-
preme in their area, but their existence should not preclude judicious
application of realization where the shareholder benefits are broader and
more varied than merely avoiding a tax at the shareholder level by
accumulations of highly liquid assets beyond the reasonable needs of
the business.
53 Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Proposed Reg. § 1.001-1(a). This proposed
regulation contains this sentence: "The fair market value of property is a question of fact,
but only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair
market value." To the same effect is U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.44-4 (1953). It may well be
doubted whether this is an entirely accurate statement of Burnet v. Logan or the present
Tax Court position. See Hurlburt, 25 T.C. 1286 (1956).
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It comes to this. A shareholder should be considered as having real-
ized accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation in the form
of dividends when such gains in an ascertainable amount are primarily
devoted to purposes which serve interests of the shareholder distinct
from his interest as a proprietor of the business conducted by the cor-
poration. When this occurs all the tests of realization seem satisfied,
including the one laid down by Hall and Magill in their discussion of
the stock dividend and reorganization cases. That is, there has been a
change in the form and extent of the investment. The path blazed by
the stock dividend and reorganization cases can be followed farther by
providing that where an ascertainable amount of earnings and profits
so devoted remain subject to the claims of corporate creditors the basis
of the shareholder's stock should be increased by that amount.54 If re-
ceipt by the shareholder of a scrap of paper is essential, a copy of the
stock retirement contract will suffice.
The practicality of this approach rests upon establishing the feasibility
of distinguishing between what might be called the business interest of
the shareholder and his other interests. Its application to stock retire-
ment plans depends upon showing that corporate expenditures, in fund-
ing such plans with insurance, primarily serve the non-business interests
of the shareholder. The persuasiveness of the approach will depend
upon whether it has been applied by the courts. A showing of practical-
ity and applicability, together with persuasive case support, is the task
of the balance of the paper.
III. AwALis OF THE INTERESTS OF A SHAREHOLDER
The interests of a shareholder, like Gaul, may be divided into three
parts-his interest in the business activity of the corporation, his in-
terest in the investment represented by the stock, and his personal
interests which include all interests unrelated to the corporation. Ob-
viously there is not much difficulty in distinguishing between the purely
personal interests of a shareholder and his interest as a proprietor of
the trade or business being carried on. This is readily perceivable, and
many cases have held that corporate expenditures advancing such per-
sonal interests constitute dividends. Fairly typical is Louis Greenspon.5
One issue was whether corporate funds paid for operating and main-
taining a farm owned by the principal shareholder were deductible by
54 See p. 373 infra. It has been suggested that where such earnings and profits remain
subject to the claims of creditors there is a basis for asserting no distribution because of the
control retained by the corporation. Levine, "More on Casale: decision was wrong because
there was no severance of corporate property." 6 J. Taxation 289 (1957). The cases certainly
suggest such an analysis; however, it is difficult to base a solid argument on this point in
the light of the stock dividend and reorganization cases.
55 23 T.C. 138 (1954).
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the corporation where there was an insufficient showing that the ex-
penditures aided the business of the corporation. It was held that the cor-
poration was not entitled to a deduction and that the expenditure
amounted to a dividend notwithstanding the lack of corporate formality.
Another similar, but perhaps more sophisticated, instance is Clark v.
Commissioner.56 Here the controlling shareholder, after establishing an
irrevocable trust for his children with the corporation as trustee, had
the corporation transfer to itself, as trustee, all its earnings and profits.
The distribution was taxable to the shareholder. Examples could be
multiplied.5 7 Indeed, Casale itself falls within this category.
The situation is different when it comes to distinguishing the share-
holder's business interest from his interest as an investor in corporate
stock. Perhaps the distinction can best be seen by the light of an
example. The purchase, by a corporation engaged in the sale of widgets,
of machinery necessary to produce widgets serves the business interest
of its shareholders; whereas the purchase by the same corporation of a
safe deposit box, which it must permit the shareholders to use as a reposi-
tory of their shares because of a contract, serves their investment in-
terest. In the case of the safe deposit box it can be argued easily, and
perhaps convincingly, that the corporate act advanced corporate pur-
poses in that it contributed to the continuity of the corporate business
by helping to eliminate problems arising from lost shares. However, it
cannot be gainsaid that the expenditure substantially is to serve an
interest of the shareholder distinct from his interest as an owner of a
widget making company, or from his purely personal interests.
The activities of a shareholder incident to the management of his
investment are gain-seeking activities which, under Higgins v. Commis-
sioner,58 do not constitute a trade or business even though the corporation
is so engaged. The type of activities which generally fall within this
area may be further illustrated by recalling those expenditures which
provide a basis for a deduction under section 212 of the Code. Thus,
investment counsel, custodial fees, clerical help, and travel expenses5"
necessary to the management of stock investments advance an interest
of the shareholder distinct from his interest in the business decisions of
those who manage the corporations in which he holds shares.
In respect to these business decisions, the shareholders' hopes, fears,
56 84 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1936).
57 E.g., Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952); Helvering v. Gordon, 87
F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1937); Ned Wayburn, 32 B.T.A. 813 (1935); Joseph Morgenstern, P-H
1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 55,086. Compare with Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C. 463
(1955) and Rev. Rul. 56-583, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 117.
58 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
59 But see, Rev. Rul. 56-511, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 170.
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joys and sorrows are those of the corporation; but this unity does not
extend to the investment interest. In New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v.
Helveringe° the Supreme Court pointed to a still prevailing axiom of
taxation when it said, "As a general rule a corporation and its stock-
holders are deemed separate entities and this is true in respect of tax
problems.1 61 That this separateness results in a discernible line between
the business of the corporation-and, accordingly, the business interest
of the shareholder-and the investment interest of the shareholder has
been made apparent by several decisions of the Court. One of the
earliest was Klein v. Board of Supervisors62 where, in upholding a Ken-
tucky statute imposing a tax upon shares owned by a domiciliary where
less than seventy-five per cent of the total property of the corporation
was located within the state, Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that while
the "expectations of the corporation are the backbone of the value of
the shares, yet the latter may get additional value from another
source. '')6 The stock is different from the property of the corporation
and so, accordingly, is the interest of the shareholder in respect to the
two.
The point is also neatly made in Burnet v. Clark" where, in denying
a deduction under the then existing operating loss carryover provisions
of payments made by a majority shareholder in performance of his
guarantee of the corporate obligations on the ground that the share-
holder was not engaged in a business even though his guarantee was
to promote the business success of the corporation, the Court empha-
sized that the business of the corporation was not the business of the
shareholder. That is, management and conservation of his investment in
the corporation was distinguishable from the corporate business.
Probably the most dramatic illustrations of this fact are set forth in
Deputy v. Du Pont65 and Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner."
In the former, the Court pointed out that expenses incurred by a
shareholder in selling the corporation stock to its executives, which,
because of legal difficulties, could not be sold by the corporation, were
proximately related to the business of the corporation and not the share-
holder's business. The same conclusion was reached, even though the
nexus between shareholder and corporation was even closer, in Inter-
state Transit Lines. There the corporate parent sought to deduct, as an
60 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
61 Id. at 442.
62 282 U.S. 19 (1930).
63 Id. at 23.
64 287 U.S. 410 (1932).
65 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
66 319 U.S. 590 (1943).
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ordinary and necessary expense, a payment made to its subsidiary pur-
suant to a contract whereby the parent was to manage the subsidiary's
finances, pay its bills, and absorb all its operating profits and deficits. The
payment, to cover an operating deficit, was not deductible because it
was not an expense of the parent's business. The shareholder and his
company were not engaged in the same business-their destiny not co-
terminous-their problems not identical.
While these decisions underscore the separateness of the individual
shareholder from the corporation, the converse also has been firmly
established. Thus, in Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner67 a cor-
poration entirely owned by an individual shareholder and created be-
cause of business necessity was taxable as an entity even though its busi-
ness was quite limited in scope; and in National Carbide Corp. v.
Commissioner,68 income of wholly owned subsidiaries, formed or oper-
ated for business purposes, was taxable to them and not to the parent,
even though all profits in excess of six per cent on their capitalization
was paid over to the parent pursuant to a contract between it and the
subsidiaries. And finally, in United States v. Cumberland Public Service
Co.69 and Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,7 the practicability of dis-
tinguishing between corporate acts on the one hand, and shareholder
acts on the other, was sufficiently apparent to warrant making it the
foundation of both decisions.
These deeds and words of the Supreme Court justify two important
conclusions. First, they indicate, although admittedly they do not prove,
that it is feasible to distinguish between a shareholder's concern with
his investment in the corporation and his concern with the business of
the corporation. Second, and more important, by clearly establishing
that the business of the corporation is not the business of the share-
holder, they imply, when joined with Higgins, the corollary that the
gain seeking activities of the shareholders in the nature of investment
management are not the business of the corporation.
These conclusions are in no way inconsistent with the assertion by
the first circuit in Prunier that there was "limited utility" in the distinc-
tion between stockholder purposes and corporate business purposes. The
distinction, rejected in Lewis v. Commissioner,7' an earlier first circuit
decision, as a basis for determining whether a statutory reorganization
had occurred, did have "limited utility" in that context. But the point
67 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
68 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
69 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
70 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
71 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
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being made in this analysis of the shareholder's interest is quite different.
This can best be seen by setting forth the properly rejected distinction
and the reasons for its disappoval as stated by Judges Marls and Good-
rich in their dissent in Bazley v. Commissioner.72
• . . We have long since passed the place in our thinking where we view
the corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing
only in contemplation of law." We think of it as a device that shareholders
use to carry on their business as a group. A corporation does not have
purposes apart from its shareholders. Shareholders, of course, may have
conflicting interests among themselves with regard to the conduct of their
common enterprise. They may fight with each other, perhaps, in order
to elect A instead of B to the directorship of their company. And, of
course, aside from their interest in the common enterprise, called their
corporation, they have interests as varied as hopes and desires of human
beings. But when we talk about the interest of shareholders in connection
with the business enterprise and have a finding of fact that such and such
a thing was done and that it was to the stockholders' business advantage,
speaking of them as a group, we do not find substance in a distinction
between the business advantages of the shareholders with respect to the
corporation and the business advantages of the corporation itself. (Em-
phasis added.)
This passage reveals that the distinction rejected was that which
asserted that corporate action was different from the shareholders acting
as a group. Put another way, the dissenters stated that group action is
corporate action and that shareholder-group purposes are corporate
purposes.73 Although there may be some difficulty in squaring this
common sense approach with Court Holding Co. and Cumberland Pub-
lic Service Co., there is much to commend it. However, the tripartite
analysis of a shareholder's interest being made here is quite different.
It distinguishes between the shareholder's concern for the business as a
whole-his business interest, his concern with his particular portion
thereof-his investment interest, and all his other concerns-his personal
interest. That these are not identical is recognized in the italicized por-
tion of the passage quoted. That common efforts by the shareholders
to serve their business interests are corporate action is implicit in this
analysis.
The key to the difference between the business and investment interests
of the shareholder is that the investment interest is encountered once we
leave the area of objectives held in common with other shareholders.
It seems fair to say that generally all shareholders wish for ultimate
success of the business being conducted; but the management, the
72 155 F.2d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1946), aff'd, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
73 Spear, "'Corporate Business Purpose' in Reorganization," 3 Tax L. Rev. 225, 242, 243
(1947), put it this way. "It is certainly not inconsistent with recognition of the corporate
entity to say that the purposes of the corporation and its shareholders-as-a-group are one
and the same."
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conservation, the realization, or the disposition of that portion of the
success (or failure) which the shares represent are matters about which
the shareholders can and, more often than not, do have very different
ideas and objectives. These matters are the stuff of the investment
interest.
Thus, the rejection of the distinction between corporate business pur-
poses and shareholder purposes does not invalidate the analysis presented
here. Rather it provides substantiation. In addition, this substantiation,
joined with the Supreme Court decisions discussed earlier, establishes
the feasibility of distinguishing between the business, investment, and
personal interests of the shareholder.
IV. WHAT SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS ARE PRIMARILY SERVED BY A
STOCK RETIREMENT PLAN?
The essentials of a properly drawn stock retirement plan already
have been described and, having determined that an expenditure pri-
marily to serve a non-business interest of a shareholder can be considered
a distribution to him, it remains to ascertain the interests of the share-
holder primarily being served by such plans. There are two ways to
approach this problem. One route is to analyze the precise legal rela-
tions between the corporation and the shareholders, and the other route
is to examine the mind and, in many cases at least, the heart of the
shareholders. The advocates of the results and reasoning of Prunier
and Casale favor the first because it exalts the role of the corporation
in the arrangement and lends an aura of credibility to the notion that
this contract of the corporation is precisely similar to one looking to
the purchase of widget producing machinery. On the other hand, the
latter is stressed by those preferring the Tax Court result in these
cases.7'4 Consequently, this discussion should proceed to examine the
motives of the shareholders and mention only in passing the strength
of the opposition; but gallantry, or perhaps foolhardiness, decrees
otherwise. So the lead is from weakness.
The general rule seems to be that a corporation has the capacity
to purchase its stock if it acts in good faith and without prejudice to
its creditors, unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws provide
otherwise.75 Contracts between the corporation and its shareholders
74 See Swados, "Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agreement,"
26 Fordham L. Rev. 189, 206-10 (1957).
75 Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949); Cross v. Beguelin,
226 App. Div. 349, 235 N.Y. Supp. 336 (First Dep't), aff'd, 252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E. 378
(1929); Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations § 2848 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1950). See also
Cal. Corp. Code §§ 1700-08 (Deering 1953); Del. Corp. Laws Ann. § 19 (1949); Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act art. 2.02, 2.03, 4.09 (1955).
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giving to the corporation the right to purchase the stock from the share-
holder or his estate are generally specifically enforceable by either
party.76 However, there are limitations on the authority of a corporation
to purchase its own shares. For example, in New York the purchase can
only be made from surplus; 77 and a similar restriction exists in other
jurisdictions. 7' This restriction has led to a rather curious development
in New York where the Court of Appeals in Topken, Loring & Schwartz,
Inc. v. Schwartz79 found that the promise by the corporation to purchase
the stock was not a binding promise because it could not perform if
there were no surplus and held the contract to purchase was unenforce-
able because of insufficient consideration. Holding a conditional promise
of this type the equivalent of a "choice to buy or not as it pleased" mis-
conceives the whole concept of mutuality; but the harm done was slight
because, as the opinion pointed out, additional consideration furnished
by the corporation would cure the defect. In Greater New York Carpet
House v. Herschzmann0 the Appellate Division of the First Department
held that the payment of premiums by the corporation furnished this
additional consideration. This decision has been cited approvingly in
subsequent New York decisions.8 '
There seems little question but that the corporation has an insurable
interest in the lives of its officers, directors, and principal shareholders
serving the corporation, 2 and that the payment of the premiums au-
thorized by the shareholders is an appropriate corporate expenditure.83
Most significant from the standpoint of the Prunier and Casale advocates
is that, where the corporation holds the incidents of ownership of the
policy, pays the premiums, and is designated as beneficiary, the policy
76 Murphy v. George Murphy Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 647, 166 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1957); Goldberg v. Peltier, 75 R.I. 314, 66 A.2d 107 (1949). See, Steinberg, supra
note 11, at 675.
77 Van Slochem v. Villard, 207 N.Y. 587, 101 N.E. 467 (1913) ; Cross v. Beguelin, note
75 supra.
78 E.g., In re Semolina Macaroni Co., 109 F. Supp. 453 (D.R.I. 1952); Tiedje v. Alum-
inum Taper Milling Co., - Cal. -, 296 P.2d 554 (1956); Goodman v. Global Industries,
80 Cal. App. 2d 583, 182 P.2d 300 (1947).
79 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928).
80 298 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (First Dep't 1940).
81 Ionic Shop, Inc. v. Rothfeld, 64 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946);
Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 795, 799 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953);
Murphy v. George Murphy, Inc., supra note 76.
82 United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924); Keckley v.
Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N.E. 299 (1912); Annots. 75 A.L.R. 1362 (1931),
143 A.L.R. 293 (1943). N.Y. Ins. Law § 146 requires "a lawful and substantial economic
interest in having the life, health and bodily safety of the person insured continue." Prob-
ably the mere stockholder relationship is not enough. Tate v. Commercial Building Associa-
tion, 97 Va. 74, 33 S.E. 382 (1899); Vance, Insurance 198 (3d ed. 1951). However, an
argument of no insurable interest could be made by pointing to the fact that the corpora-
tion does not benefit from the proceeds. See pp. 364-65 infra.
83 Oliver v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Pa. 1932), aff'd,
66 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1933) ; Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 75, § 2516.
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is owned by the corporation and subject to the claims of its creditors. 4
As previously indicated, this point was strongly relied upon in Casale.
Further strengthening this position is the recent New York decision in
Newman v. Superintendent of Insurance, 5 in which it was held that,
where the insurance was payable to the corporation which paid the
premiums, the insured shareholder had no right to the policy upon the
sale of his stock and termination of his relationship with the corpora-
tion, even though the shareholders had agreed that the proceeds of the
policy were to be paid by the corporation to the surviving widow of
the shareholder in exchange for the stock and that the insurance was
not to be considered an asset in valuing the stock. The court said the
shareholder had no right to the proceeds until "death and payment
of the benefit to the corporation.186
This suggestion, that the shareholder's interest in the proceeds arises
at death, points to a line of thought which, to some extent, undercuts
reliance upon these legal relations as a basis for contending that a stock
retirement plan serves the business interest of the shareholder. In
Prunier, the Tax Court stated that the rules of law applicable to the
controversy there involved were well settled. Where the estate, or
family, of an officer or employee of the corporation was the beneficiary,
the premiums were income to the officer or employee and deductible by
the corporation; but where the corporation was directly, or indirectly,
the beneficiary, the premiums were neither deductible by the corpora-
tion nor income to the officer or employee. Similar reasoning made
premiums dividends when stockholders were the beneficiaries. These
views were not rejected by the first circuit, it viewing the corporation
as the beneficial owner of the policies and entitled to have the aid of
a court of equity to recover the proceeds. In support of this, several
cases, including Massachusetts Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding,17 were cited
in which the governing principle was that where one, who is, or can
designate, the beneficiary, promises for a sufficient consideration to pay
the proceeds to a third person, an equitable right to such proceeds vests
in such person subject to the rights of those having superior equities.18
This theory also would seem adequate to vest the shareholder brothers
84 Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1933); Wolter v. Johnston,
34 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1929); Collier, Bankruptcy § 70.15(6) (1942). There is no exemption
under N.Y. Ins. Law § 166.
85 166 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
86 Id. at 68.
87 312 Mass. 147, 43 N.E.2d 521 (1942).
88 This view is widely recognized, although the precise theory upon which it rests is not
certain. See, Thompson v. Van MTse, 133 NJ.L. 524, 45 A.2d 182 (1946); Hirsch v. Auer,
146 N.Y. 13, 40 N.E. 397 (1895); Maher v. Byrnes, 259 App. Div. 272, 18 N.Y.S.2d 838
(First Dep't 1940); Annots. 102 A.L.R. 588 (1936); 1 Richards, Insurance § 115 (5th ed.
1952).
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in Prunier with similar rights.8 9 And if so, they appear to be "bene-
ficiaries."
But whether they are "beneficiaries" within the rules held by the
Tax Court to be applicable is not clear. The rules appear to be bot-
tomed on the language of section 2 64(a) (1) of the Code which denies
a deduction to a corporation which pays premiums on insurance covering
the life of any officer or employee where it is the beneficiary directly
or indirectly. This means that the denial of the deduction is not con-
trolled by the form of the policy,90 but rests upon analysis of the eco-
nomic realities.91 Thus, the argument would run, looking at the equitable
rights of the Prunier brothers and using the touchstone of economic
reality, they are the beneficiaries. And the generalizations might follow,
that in any stock retirement plan funded by insurance the beneficiaries
are other than the corporation irrespective of the beneficiary designated
by the policy.91a
Any analysis in terms of economic realities cannot, however, exclude
considerations of the immunity of policies and proceeds sometimes
afforded by the state exemption laws. Under some of these laws a policy
acquired for the purpose of funding a stock retirement plan naming the
stockholder's wife as the beneficiary is probably an entirely different
kind of corporate asset from one naming the corporation as beneficiary,
even though all the normal incidents of ownership, including the right
to change the beneficiary, are retained by the corporation in both cases.
Where the wife is named, under New York law, for example, the policy
89 It is interesting that the first circuit, in recognizing the enforceability of the contract
to purchase the shares, did not characterize the rights of the brothers as property, or equita-
ble, in nature, but spoke of them as "contractual." There seems no reason why the rights
of a shareholder to the proceeds in a properly drawn plan should not be considered as
"equitable" in nature.
90 See Ernest J. Keefe, 15 T.C. 947 (1950) ; Proposed Reg. § 1.264(b).
91 The case law authorities cited by the Tax Court to support its well established
principles tend to bear out this analysis. In two of the cases, Frank F. Yuengling, 27 B.T.A.
782 (1933) and Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1937), the employee-share-
holder's family seemed to be the owner of the policies. In Yuengling they were assigned
to a trustee for their benefit and in Bonwit the corporation retained no power to change
the beneficiary. Thus, more was present than merely making them the beneficiary. Cf.
Estate of Edward Doerken, 46 B.T.A. 809 (1942). However, only the identity of the bene-
ficiary in the formal sense was discussed in George Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929)
and N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930). O.D. 627, 3 Cum. Bull. 104 (1920) is
equivocal. It asserts that premiums paid on insurance covering the life of an officer or
employee under which "the corporation is not in any way a beneficiary" will be income to
such an officer or employee.91a Realization by the shareholders of corporate earnings and profits invested in insurance
to fund stock retirement plans should occur when there is an enforceable right in the share-
holders to have the insurance proceeds applied to retirement of their shares. See p. 346
supra. Currently there is some practice of funding the plans with insurance although no
mention of this fact is made in the stock retirement agreement. This should not, under the
thesis advanced by this paper, prevent realization by the shareholder unless in fact there
is no obligation on the part of the corporation to use the proceeds for stock retirement
purposes. Where none exists some protection of the beneficiaries of the deceased shareholder
has been sacrificed for a tax advantage.
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and its proceeds may be insulated from attacks by corporate creditors.92
This means that, while the form of the policy may not control in deter-
mining the "beneficiary" within the meaning of the rules laid down by
the Tax Court, it cannot be ignored. A policy naming the corporation
as beneficiary even where the proceeds must be paid out to purchase
stock probably does benefit the corporation in a more substantial way
than one naming the estate or wife of the shareholder.
Nonetheless, while recognizing that under a properly drawn stock retire-
ment plan the fact that the cash surrender value of the policies and their
proceeds are available to corporate creditors lends strength to the view
that the corporation is the real beneficiary of the policy and that, con-
sequently, business interests of the shareholders are being served by
the plan, an analysis of the rights of the deceased shareholder's estate,
or beneficiaries of that estate, in respect to the proceeds points in other
directions. This means we are justified, at least, in turning to examine
the mind and heart of the shareholders.
When this is done the case for the investment and personal interest
of the shareholders is formidable. Obviously, it is difficult to generalize
about the motives of shareholders who enter into these plans. It is
believed, however, that there are five reasons, not including income tax
saving motives, why these plans are executed-only one of which serves
the business interest of the shareholder in the same manner as the
purchase of widget producing machinery. These are, with the one serv-
ing the business interest placed first, as follows:
1. To provide a plan which will assure continuance of the business
of the corporation with desirable associates following the death or re-
tirement of a principal shareholder. 93
2. To provide a device whereby unrelated shareholders of a close
92 This observation is based on the following provision of § 166 of N.Y. Ins. Law.
"If any policy of insurance has been or shall be effected by any person on the life of another
person in favor of a third person beneficiary, or made payable, by assignment, change
of beneficiary or otherwise, to a third person, such third person beneficiary, assignee or
payee shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of such policy as against the creditors,
personal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers in state and federal courts of
the person insured and of the person effecting the insurance." "Proceeds and avail" include
the cash surrender value and the quoted provision is applicable even though a right to
change the beneficiary is retained. Thus, if the corporation takes out the policy on the life
of the shareholder naming his wife as beneficiary, the policy appears exempt from claims
of corporate creditors. Whether this exemption will permit avoidance of the New York
rule requiring a corporation to purchase its shares from surplus is uncertain. See, note 77.
Cf. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 73, § 850 (Smith-Hurd 1940); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 175 § 125 (1948).
Sometimes the immunity extends only to creditors of the insured. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3911.10 (Page 1954).
93 This prospect of continuance will, as the First Circuit in Prunier pointed out, aid the
corporation's credit standing during the life of the shareholder. Prunier v. Commissioner,
248 F.2d 818, 822 (1st Cir. 1957). See, Dodd, "Purchase and Redemption By a Corpora-
tion of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law," 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 697, 723 (1941).
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corporation can determine which of them will ultimately acquire the
business being conducted by the corporation.
3. To provide a device whereby related shareholders of a close cor-
poration can transfer the business to those shareholders who are the
natural objects of bounty of the shareholder most likely to predecease.
4. To provide a source of liquid funds for the beneficiaries of the
deceased shareholder's estate freed from the burdens of the corporate
business.
5. To provide a means of establishing the value of closely held stock
for estate tax purposes. 4
Reason number five is well known, but a word about two, three, and
four should be said. In respect to the second and fourth reason, the
stock retirement plan, as well as a cross-purchase arrangement, solves
a fairly difficult problem. Naturally, none of the shareholders under
ordinary circumstances wish to have the business imperiled by death
or retirement of any of their number, but at the same time often each
wishes that he could finally own the entire concern. But the decision
as to the ultimate owner is not easy. Why not leave it to chance? Many
important decisions which will not yield to more rational resolution are
decided by this method; and permitting the more durable to take al-
most all, accords with the commonly observed phenomenon of certain
rewards accruing to those who have the good fortune to survive their
colleagues. So viewed, the stock retirement plan, like the cross-purchase,
establishes an understandable and morally justified game of chance in
which the loser has the assurance of a cash bounty to his loved ones.
This calculated risk, to use an overworked phrase, does not relate to
the business of the corporation but to the investment interest of the
shareholders. Admittedly it preserves the goose which lays the golden
eggs; but more important, it determines who gets the goose and all
future eggs.
Although the game of chance sometimes has application even where
the shareholders are related, more often the respective ages point
strongly to the probable survivors. In this case both the stock retirement
and cross-purchase provide a means whereby the shareholder most likely
to predecease the others can transmit the business to them. This is an
accomplishment which serves the personal and investment interests of
the shareholder. These realities are not ignored by writers other than
in the tax field. For example, Dean Stevens and Larson, in their case-
94 Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396
(2d Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1, Cum. Bull. 194; Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1, Cum.
Bull. 187. This objective is presently difficult to attain where the stock retirement plan is
funded by insurance. See, Swados, supra note 74, at 210; note 105 infra.
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book on corporation law, pointed out that the chief purpose of these
plans is "to facilitate retention of control by the survivors when one
stockholder dies, and at the same time provide the cash equivalent of
the stock interest of the deceased to his estate."95 O'Neal stressed the
latter point as the basis for suggesting that the shareholders or corpora-
tion, as the case may be, have imposed on them an obligation to purchase
upon the death of a shareholder.96 Further, in recommending that the
shareholders, rather than directors, in a dily called meeting approve
these arrangements, he observed that "this sort of agreement could
hardly be said to be ordinary business.197 More important from the stand-
point of tax law, which under Prunier and Casale seems to be drawing
a highly important, but nonetheless artificial, distinction between stock
retirement and cross-purchase plans, is the fact that writers in the
corporate field tend to regard the two devices as but different means of
accomplishing the same ends.98 This equivalence has been recognized
in the New York courts. For example, in Greater New York Carpet
House, Inc. v. Herschmann,99 in describing the stock retirement plan
funded with insurance there involved, the court said:
The present agreement was much more than a simple contract for the pur-
chase and sale of stock. It was an attempt by two stockholders who
owned all the stock of a corporation to arrange a method whereby the
surviving stockholder would acquire complete corporate control. The
provision that tke corporation would purchase the survivor's stock was
merely the means to an end.-"D (Emphasis added.)
A similar view was expressed in the recent case, Murphy v. George
Murphy, Inc.1
Thus, an analysis of the motives leading to a stock retirement plan
indicates that stock retirement plans primarily serve the personal and
investment interests of the shareholders. Further support for this view
can be furnished by examining the balance sheet of the corporation be-
fore death of the shareholder and after purchase of the shares. Assume
that X corporation has authorized and issued 500 shares of voting com-
mon having a par value of $100 which are equally owned by A and B.
The total assets of X, excluding insurance, have a book value of
$100,000, and the corporation carries a policy on the life of A and B
95 Stevens and Larson, Cases on Corporations 573 (2d ed. 1955).
96 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock In Closely Held Corporations: Planning
and Drafting," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 796 (1952).
97 Id. at 789, n. 62.
98 E.g., Israels and Gorman, Corporate Practice 19 (Practising Law Institute 1955).
Even White, Business Insurance, c. 13 (2d ed. 1956) distinguishes the two on the basis of
the income tax differences.
99 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dep't 1940).
100 Id. at 651, 17 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
101 7 Misc. 2d 647, 166 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
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in the amount of $50,000 each, the proceeds of which are to be used to
purchase the stock of the shareholder who predeceases the other. Im-
mediately following A's death and payment of $50,000 by the insurance
company, X's assets, excluding any cash surrender value of the policy
on B's life, amount to $150,000 and the surplus account now shows a
balance of $100,000. Upon purchase of A's shares, X's assets return
to $100,000102 and capital and surplus, adjusted in the manner required
by the circumstances or state law, °3 would equal the same amount. The
corporation is no richer than before. Indeed, it is poorer to the extent of
the loss of A's skill and knowledge and the cash surrender value of A's
policy immediately before deathl The profit of the transaction accrues
to B because his investment has increased in size; but the assets devoted
to the business have not increased. In this sense, the insurance proceeds
did not enrich the corporation even though they were exchanged for
the treasury stock.1 4 The result is not changed where the valuation
of A's shares includes the insurance policies and proceeds so long as the
entire amount of proceeds received because of A's death are paid over
to his estate. The only difference is that the amount of insurance re-
quired greatly increases. 105
Thus, although it must be admitted that these plans do advance the
business interest of the shareholders, a realistic appraisal of the purposes
served by them, as well as their economic consequences, leaves no ques-
tion but that they primarily advance the investment and personal in-
terests of the shareholders. Only one thing remains to be done before
the vindication of the Tax Court result in Prunier and Casale is com-
plete. Persuasive case support for the analysis advanced here, in ad-
dition to that already presented, should be mustered to the greatest
extent posssible.
V. CASE SUPPORT FOR THE INVESTMENT INTEREST ANALYsIs
The posture of the decided cases does not unequivocally support the
views expressed here; however, neither is there complete repudiation.
102 Treasury stock is not shown as an asset. See, Sunley and Carter, Corporate Account-
ing 90, 91 (rev. ed. 1944).
103 Ibid.
104 In Prunier, 248 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1957) the court reasoned that the corporation
was enriched even though the insurance proceeds were exchanged for stock. The implicit
premise of this observation is that treasury stock should be considered the same as any
other asset. This is improper accounting and unrealistic because the shares are not an asset
upon which creditors can realize. Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir.
1925).
105 Under Proposed Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (6) the failure to include the proceeds of insur-
ance in valuing stock may destroy the efficacy of the plan as fixing the estate tax valuation
of the shares. Whether such failure will always upset the presumption of full and adequate
consideration provided where the agreement is the result of arm's length bargaining between
strangers by Proposed Reg. 20.2031-2 (h) is not clear.
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The truth of the matter is that, viewed from the standpoint of the ap-
proach suggested in this paper, the Tax Court speaks in a contradictory
fashion, the circuits are in conflict, and the Supreme Court is uncom-
mitted, save to the extent that the cases discussed earlier in the analysis
of a shareholder's interests tend to give support.
The cases which furnish the basis for this conclusion have various
pivots. Some involve distinguishing between a dividend, and an ordinary
and necessary expense incurred in the trade or business of the corpora-
tion; others turn on the difference between capital expenditures and
dividends; still others concern themselves with drawing the line between
partial liquidations, or redemptions, and dividends; and finally the
problem sometimes is to separate losses suffered by the corporation from
dividends paid by it. Notwithstanding the variety of statutory back-
ground involved, it is fair to say that most of the cases reveal a com-
mon approach. That is, in determining the character of the particular
corporate action the courts attempt to determine whether the action was
predominantly beneficial to the corporation, or to all, or part, of the
shareholders. This is unfortunate for two reasons.
In the first place, the test tends to obscure the distinction between the
investment and business interest of the shareholder which often results
in the tacit assumption that a shareholder has only two interests-
business and personal. Hampered by this false assumption, the inclina-
tion often times is to regard any corporate expenditure which does not
predominantly promote an object unrelated to corporate activity as
something other than a dividend. Secondly, overlooking the investment
interest almost destroys any hope of successfully asserting a dividend
when the corporate action in question results in the acquisition of an
asset. How can an action predominantly be for the personal benefit of a
shareholder when the corporation obtained a valuable asset as its result?
The song of Casale has been performed numerous times.
This judicial myopia has not been universal. There are cases where the
vision, aided sometimes by the refraction provided by Higgins v. Com-
missioner, Deputy v. Du Pont, and Interstate Transit Lines v. Commis-
sioner, has been clear and discerning. Consider this one. In Knight-
Campbell Music Co. v. Commissioner,0 6 the issue was the deductibility
by the corporation of legal fees incurred when the two principal common
stockholders, against whom preferred stockholders had obtained a per-
sonal judgment running to the corporation together with the appointment
of a receiver to liquidate the business, employed attorneys to resist
liquidation and 'obtain the return of the corporation. The successful
106 155 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1946).
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efforts of the attorneys resulted in a cancellation of the personal judg-
ment and retirement of the preferred stock. The fee was originally paid
by the two common stockholders at the insistence of a corporate creditor
and they were later reimbursed by the corporation. A deduction by the
corporation as an ordinary and necessary expense was denied because
the voluntary assumption of an obligation arising from efforts of the
shareholders to free themselves from personal judgments was not an
ordinary and necessary expense of the corporate business. The invest-
ment interest of the shareholders was recognized because, although the
expenditure bore a closer relation to the corporate destiny than one to
build a swimming pool in the common stockholders' back yard, funda-
mentally the expense was incurred to adjust a conflict between share-
holders relating to their part of the business. A handful of cases involv-
ing similar facts have displayed equally good vision.1 7
Payments made to adjust control of the corporation between share-
holders have been recognized by the Tax Court as serving the invest-
ment interest of the shareholder. Thus, in Jackson Howell08 it held that
a redemption of some of the shareholder's shares, designed to preserve
their same fractional interests in the corporation, and made necessary
by the elimination of a trust as a shareholder, was a taxable dividend
under the 1939 Code and this was so even though the trust's elimination
originated with a demand by Chevrolet under whom the corporation
held a dealership. The court recognized that the redemption of the shares
held by the trust would not be a dividend, but distinguished the re-
demptions made to maintain the status quo of corporate control by
pointing out that these were not required by Chevrolet's demand that
the trust be eliminated as a shareholder. 09 Similar recognition was ac-
107 Hales-Mullaly, Inc. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1942) (sums paid for
legal fees and to compromise litigation based on alleged fraud of principal shareholders of
taxpayer committed prior to its organization in the nature of a conspiracy to procure busi-
ness of plaintiff but for which taxpayer may have been liable not deductible because not
ordinary nor incurred in carrying on business of taxpayer); One Hundred Five West Fifty-
Fifth Street, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1930) (payments by corporate tax-
payer in settlement of dispute between its shareholders over right of one of them to sub-
scribe for its stock were neither a loss nor a deductible expense of taxpayer.); George D.
Mann, 33 B.T.A. 281 (1935) (sums paid by corporations to assist shareholder purchase
stock from wife where in divorce action there had been a dispute as to the ownership of
the stock was taxable dividend); Appeal of Forty-Four Cigar Co., 2 B.T.A. 1156 (1925)
(payments made by corporation to relative of its president to cease efforts to oust president
from control of taxpayer were neither an expense or loss of the corporation).
108 26 T.C. 846 (1956), affirmed sub nom. Phelps v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 156 (9th
Cir. 1957).
109 Compare Jackson Howell, supra note 108, with Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937
(D.C. Cir. 1940); James F. Boyle, 14 T.C. 1382 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951). Compare these cases with Trico Products Corp., 46 B.T.A. 346
(1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943), rehearing denied,
321 U.S. 801 (1944).
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corded this interest in Joseph R. Holsey"10 and Louis H. Zipp."' In the
former the purchase by the corporation of fifty per cent of its stock
pursuant to an option assigned to it by the shareholder who held the
other half of the stock was a taxable dividend to the assignor of the op-
tion. The Tax Court saw no distinction between this transaction and
the assumption and discharge of the assignor's obligation to purchase,
had he exercised the option on his own behalf. In the latter the redemp-
tion of a principal shareholder's stock with funds borrowed by the cor-
poration for this purpose was a dividend to the remaining shareholders
who, after a disagreement with the principal shareholder on business
policy, wished to acquire the entire business free from any control or
obstruction by him.
Perhaps the recent ninth circuit decision in Doran v. Commissioner,"'
wherein the court looked through the confusing form of the transaction
to find that the insurance policies paid for by the corporation were pur-
chased for, and on behalf of, the shareholders who used the proceeds
to purchase the stock of a deceased shareholder, stands for an incipient
awareness that corporate expenditures for insurance premiums whose
proceeds are to be exchanged for a deceased shareholder's stock foster
the investment interest. Certainly this can be said of a brace of early
cases which have been cited extensively in the literature concerning
stock retirement plans-Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commis-
sioner,"' and Casper Ranger Construction Co."4 In the first case, the
shareholder was held taxable on premiums paid by the corporation on
policies which named the shareholder's wife as beneficiary, the share-
holder retaining a right to change that designation where the proceeds
were to be used to adjust the purchase price of stock between share-
holders. Interstate Transit Lines and Deputy v. du Pont figured promi-
nently in the fifth circuit's opinion. In Casper Ranger Construction
Co. payment of premiums by the corporation on policies under which
it was not the beneficiary was considered dividend income to the in-
sured stockholders.
Finally, recognition of the views stated herein can be readily seen
in Sanders v. Fox."' Premiums paid by the corporation to fund a stock
retirement plan were taxable dividends to the shareholders. The court,
after examining what it considered to be the substance of the transaction,
concluded that the "benefits" flowing to the shareholders from the cor-
110 28 T.C. No. 107 (1957).
Ill 28 T.C. No. 32 (1957).
112 246 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957).
113 153 F.2d 602 (Sth Cir. 1946).
114 1 B.T.A. 942 (1925).
115 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957), appeal pending 10th Circuit.
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porate expenditures were sufficient to justify treating them as dividends.
However, as indicated, the Tax Court speaks with a divided voice.
Notwithstanding its clear tones in Prunier, Casale, Jackson Howell,
Holsey and Zipp, rejection of the analysis here advanced is implicit in
its recent decision in Shoe Corporation of America.116 The issue was
the deductibility of litigation expenses incurred in a stockholder's deriva-
tive suit which resulted in an injunction preventing the corporate man-
agement from accomplishing a recapitalization plan which was designed
to vest control of the corporation in the family of which management
was a part. The state court issuing the injunction directed that the
fees, including the costs of the shareholder plaintiff, be paid by the
corporation. All were held deductible as ordinary and necessary ex-
penses even though plainly these were disbursements primarily advanc-
ing the investment interests of shareholders. Put in the language neces-
sary for denial of the deduction, the fees were not expenses of the cor-
porate business notwithstanding the state court decree. This decree
merely recognized the fairness of charging the fees in accordance with
the stock ownership of the shareholders.
The decision of the Tax Court appears to be bottomed upon an ac-
ceptance of the views of its Judge Bruce, expressed in a dissent in James
E. Caldwell & Co.,117 which were incorporated in the sixth circuit's re-
versal of that case.1 ' The pertinent issue in Caldwell was the deductibil-
ity of something in excess of $120,000, paid by the corporate taxpayer
as the result of a judgment taken against it and some of its shareholders,
because of certain improper acts in milking the assets of another corpora-
tion and an expenditure of $1500 paid to an attorney for assistance in
determining how the liability would be apportioned between the judg-
ment debtors. The holding that the fees were not deductible drew heavily
upon Kornhauser v. United States-"' and Deputy v. du Pont, while
Judge Bruce emphasized the fact that the state court found the cor-
porate taxpayer to be a joint tortfeasor whose only course was to pay
the judgment. The case, perhaps, is distinguishable from Shoe Corpora-
tion of America in that the state court findings do not absolutely preclude
a finding that the corporate wrongs were serving the business interests
of the shareholders; but it is more probable that they served their per-
sonal interests and that the payments involved did likewise.
The disagreement exists in the circuit courts also. In addition to
116 29 T.C. No. 33 (1957). Compare with Royal Cotton Mill Company, 29 T.C.
No. 84 (1958).
217 24 T.C. 597, 615 (1955). See, Fred F. Fischer, P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 47,131 for
earlier misconceptions in this area.
118 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956).
119 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
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Prunier and Casale, which clash with the substance of Knight-Campbell
Music Co. and Doran, the eighth circuit decision in Tucker v. Commis-
sioner also conflicts. 120 There, to prevent the corporation's loss of its
Ford dealership, it was necessary for Tucker to acquire a majority in-
terest therein. In accomplishing this Tucker purchased stock from an-
other to whom, as a part of the same transaction, the corporation agreed
to pay a certain sum over a five-year period. Although recognizing that
the corporate payments benefited Tucker, the court found equal benefits
flowing to the corporation and its other shareholders-a finding which,
in its view, precluded charging Tucker with dividends to the extent of
such payments.
Nowhere is the deceptive nature of the "benefit" analysis better re-
vealed than in this case. Expenditures which directly serve the invest-
ment interest always further, to some extent, the group's ability to carry
on the business for which they joined together. In that sense they always
provide a benefit to the corporation, but the immediate and primary
objective is to affect the investment the shareholder has in the business.
To repeat, this cannot be fully grasped, so long as "the weighing of
benefits" occupies the court's attention.
Another decision of the eighth circuit, Lewis v. O'Malley'2 ' is often
cited as generally supporting the views of the first and second circuits in
Prunier and Casale. There the corporation purchased a single premium
insurance policy on the life of its president and principal shareholder
which gave him the power to designate the beneficiary thereof. Not-
withstanding the fact that the corporation was never designated as
beneficiary, the facts indicated that the policy had been treated con-
sistently as an asset of the corporation for the purpose of maintaining
the credit rating of the corporation. The premium was not considered
a dividend. The case is sound on its facts. Apparently the premium was
primarily to advance the business interest of the shareholder and not a
personal or investment interest.
The other circuit court mainstay of those who applaud the disposition
at that level of Prunier and Casale cannot, however, be turned aside in
this manner. This is the third circuit decision in Emeloid Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner,'22 in which it was held, somewhat gratuitously it should
be said, that "borrowed investment capital," as used in the World War
II Excess Profits Tax Act, included sums borrowed to purchase single
premium policies where proceeds were to be used in a stock retirement
120 Earlier the eighth circuit in Ruben v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1938)
rejected an investment interest analysis in a situation having a strong similarity to the facts
of James E. Caldwell & Co., note 117 and 118 supra.
121 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
122 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951).
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plan. To reach this view it was necessary to find that the indebtedness
was incurred "for business reasons." This was done by stressing the
business reason mentioned earlier'- and ignoring the other motivations
behind these arrangements. Notwithstanding the residuum of taxpayer
appeal that lurks in every excess profits tax case, the case deserves the
reliance placed upon it. Its reasoning is inconsistent with the analysis
made in this paper, even though a gimlet-eyed view could possibly war-
rant the assertion that a finding that a loan was incurred "for business
reasons" is not in conflict with a determination that it was primarily
for investment reasons.
The decisions reviewed here constitute the main stream of applicable
authority-and, as said before, the direction indicated is not clear. If
anything, however, the trend is against the position here taken; but, of
course, this does not establish its correctness. In any event, these cases
and the reasoning advanced heretofore constitute the defense of the Tax
Court's result in Prunier and Casale. Only a few remnants need atten-
tion before the case is complete.
VI. REMNANTS AND REITERATIONS
The first circuit in Prunier closed its opinion with what might be re-
garded as an ominous caveat. "What will happen when one of the
brothers dies is not before us," were the court's dark words. This ex-
pression suggests, in addition to unexpressed judicial difficulties with
realization problems, that the taxpayer's victory might well be a pyrrhic
one with disaster in the form of bunched dividend income awaiting the
execution of the plan. Obviously the caveat is sound so far as the estate
of the deceased shareholder is concerned because of the treacherous
nature of sections 302 and 318 of the Code. Furthermore, the partially
submerged reef built by these sections will probably not be eliminated
by taxing the premiums to the shareholders, although such a course would
lend some support to a taxpayer's contention that the tax consequences
throughout should be made equivalent to a cross-purchase arrange-
ment.124
Whether the caveat was in any way directed to the surviving share-
holders is uncertain; however, speculation on taxation of these hereto-
fore supposed fortunate individuals opens interesting vistas. Immedi-
ately two theories can be imagined which might be used to reach the
gain of the survivors. The first would be to treat the insurance proceeds
used to redeem the stock as a dividend distribution to the survivors and
123 See p. 362 supra.
124 See note 17 supra.
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increase the basis of their stock by the same amount.125 The second
would be to determine the increase in the net worth of the survivors,
resulting from the death of a shareholder and the execution of the plan,
and treat that amount as a gain to the survivors taxable at ordinary
rates. Presumably this amount could be treated as a dividend from the
standpoint of corporate earnings and profits and the basis of the stock
held by the survivors would be increased pro tanto. While in some in-
stances the amount of income to the survivors would be the same ir-
respective of the theory employed, this would not always be the case
because of the variations in the manner in which the shares are valued
under the agreement.
Assuming that it is desirable to withhold the arm of the tax gatherer
until death of a shareholder and that the estate of the deceased does not
receive the black bean, the second of the two theories seems preferable
from the standpoint of logic and fairness. To treat the proceeds as a
dividend distribution seems inconsistent with a refusal to treat the
premiums as dividends (do not both serve the investment interest?),
and, furthermore, the amount of the proceeds may not correspond with
the actual increase in value of the survivor's shares. This increase is
the proper measure of the taxpayer's increase in net worth. Nonetheless
the first theory has Joseph H. Holsey,"'6 Zipp, and Doran to lean upon,
while the second is bedeviled by realization difficulties.
There is, however, something draconic about allowing the earnings
and profits of the corporation to be converted into insurance without
tax consequences and then harshly extending the government's hand at
the time of death to receive the deferred tax swollen by the progessive
rates. In addition, the identity of the obligor is capricious because of
the mechanistic workings of the Code; and, when it permits the estate
of the deceased to escape its jaws, the uncertainty of the amount to be
imposed upon the survivors is quite vexing. It appears much wiser to
treat the premiums as dividends in proportion to the stock ownership
125 Support for this approach can be found in Note, 67 Yale L.J. 112, 119, n. 34 (1957).
126 In Note, 67 Yale L.J. 112, 118 (1957) the author states: "As a departure from exist-
ing law, Holsey should be construed to embody these considerations and to require taxation
of all shareholders whose proportionate interests are increased by stock redemptions." The
approach and reasoning of this note generally supports the position stated in this paper;
however, conceding the possibility of taxing the survivors, it seems much fairer where stock
retirement plans are funded by insurance to treat the premium payments as dividends
rather than the disbursements of the proceeds. The Holsey doctrine can be reserved for
other situations where the result and purpose of redemption is to achieve a present, or
gradual, readjustment of ownership and control between shareholders which does not
amount to a genuine contraction of the business that alters its scope and character and which
is not prompted solely by the desire of a shareholder to withdraw from the enterprise. For
a discussion of some related problems in the redemption area, see, Bittker, "Stock Redemp-
tions and Partial Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 9 Stan. L. Rev. 13
(1956). But see, Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 707 (1958).
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and correspondingly increase each shareholder's basis in his stock by
the amount for which he was charged. 27 So approached, the redemption
would have no immediate tax consequences to either the survivors or
the estate of the deceased.2 8 While an amendment to the Code is prob-
ably necessary to accomplish this result in many family corporations,
there seems to be no obstacle so far as other closely held corporations
are concerned.
Now one more remnant-and the term here is plainly apt. It is the
accumulated earnings tax. It has already been indicated that this pro-
vision of the Code does not provide the proper solution to the problem
posed by stock retirement plans funded with insurance. This is true for
three reasons.
In the first place, an investment of corporate earnings in insurance is
significantly different from accumulating cash, or other similarly liquid
assets, even where both are for the purpose of redeeming the shares of
a deceased shareholder. Insurance has a peculiar characteristic-the
capacity to instantly increase in value upon the death of the insured-
which cash does not possess. This means that in respect of insurance,
the corporation does not have the freedom of use that attaches to cash.
To convert insurance into cash, or in any other asset for that matter,
destroys a valuable characteristic, and one, in the case of a now un-
insurable shareholder, not obtainable from any other source. These
are familiar observations, for they are the heart of the inducement of-
fered by insurance companies in suggesting that insurance be used to
fund a stock retirement plan. Their validity prohibits comparison with
accumulation of cash or other liquid assets, and suggests means other
than the accumulated earnings tax for dealing with efforts to use the
127 There are some logical difficulties to this approach which should be revealed. In the
first place, the benefit to the shareholder from the premium payment may not be com-
mensurate with the amount of premium charged to him. For example, X, who owns 70%
of the stock, does not receive an equivalent benefit where the only other shareholder is Y,
who is unrelated to X and a much younger man. However, no more fair method of allocat-
ing the income than in proportion to the stock ownership appears feasible. Second, while
the text suggests regarding the entire premiums as reinvested in the corporate business to
reflect the fact that the policy does remain available to the creditors of the business, it is
clear in fact, that only the portion of the premium which goes to increase the cash surrender
value is so available. The balance of the premium was the cost of the coverage for the pre-
mium period. This suggests that the increase in stock basis should be restricted to the
amount of the increase of the cash surrender value of the policies held by the corporation.
Or perhaps these facts suggest that the dividend might be restricted in amount to the cost
of coverage for the premium period and that the basis remain unchanged. Admittedly these
are possibilities; and it is a desire for simplicity, more than logic, which prompts the
suggestion made in the text. It does not seem to be an unreasonable one. See Steinberg,
supra note 11, at n.13.
128 That is, the estate of the decedent will receive an amount in exchange for its stock
equal to its basis therein and no distribution will be considered to have been made to the
survivors. Probably the excess of the proceeds over the aggregate premiums paid will con-
stitute earnings and profits available for distribution. Rev. Rul. 54-230, 1954-1 Cum. Bull.
114; White, Business Insurance 396 (2d ed. 1956).
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corporate structure to avoid tax at the shareholder level revealed in
stock retirement plans.
Secondly, the accumulated earnings tax makes even-handed treatment
of corporations and shareholders so using the corporate structure im-
possible. This results from the $60,000 minimum accumulation per-
mitted without adverse tax consequences under the present Code. Some
corporations would be free to employ stock retirement plans while others
could do so only at considerable risk. To extend the advantage of these
plans only to small corporations is to encourage the development of
multiple corporations and to employ an unsuitable means of assisting the
survival of small business.
Thirdly, use of the accumulated earnings tax to block the evil of these
plans requires somewhat the same type of analysis as advanced here in
support of taxing the premiums as dividends. To show that not only is
the corporation being availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income
tax, but that the accumulated earnings and profits are in excess of the
present, or anticipated, reasonable needs of the business,1 29 would re-
quire establishing that an accumulation for an investment purpose serves
no reasonable need of the business.13 0 The route, thus, offers only ad-
ditional hazards, not a safe procedure.
Now the reiterations. The Tax Court result in Prunier and Casale,
although not its precise reasoning, is approved on the grounds here
stated. The premiums in stock retirement plans substantially serve in-
terests of the shareholders distinct from their interest in the business
success of the corporation and should be considered as dividend distribu-
tions to the shareholders which are immediately reinvested and become
assets available to corporate creditors. The issue is a close one; but
there is no insuperable obstacle to the fair solution outlined here.
129 A showing that the corporation was formed or availed of for the purpose of avoid-
ing the income tax with respect to its shareholders may be made even though the accumu-
lations are not beyond the reasonable needs of the business. United Business Corp. of
America, 19 B.T.A. 809 (1930), aff'd, 62 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1933); Pelton Steel Casting Co., 28
T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1958). However, a showing that the accumula-
tion was not beyond the reasonable needs of the business reduces, or eliminates, the penalty
because of the mechanics of the accumulated earnings credit.
130 Thus the avoidance of Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951)
would require emphasis on such decisions as Trico Products Co., 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942),
aff'd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U.S.
801 (1944), which appears to have recognized the investment interest. The same can be
said of Pelton Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1958). The
court spoke of the "business" needs of the shareholders as distinguished from the "business"
needs of the corporation.
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